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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I examine the factors that influence tribal decisions regarding gaming
policy. First, I look into past accounts of the causes of gaming diffusion and attempt to overcome
some of their shortcomings. In particular, previous research has neglected the limited role of
federalism, geography, and the impact of gaming during undetermined legality. By collecting
data from gaming expansion on tribal lands in California, I provide increased nuance to the story
of gaming diffusion. I argue that proximity to major population centers will have the strongest
impact on the success of tribal casinos. Only when there is an appropriately large population near
proposed gaming sights can they maintain larger facilities. Using data from California’s Revenue
Sharing Trust Fund, I find surrounding population to be the only impactful factor in predicting
donor status contradicting many previous conclusions in the extant literature.
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benefitted from being further away from European
Since the arrival of settlers on Native American lands, settlements. Their autonomy as tribes was protected by
location has played an important role for the health and the relatively minimal interaction with the new settlers.
well-being of the Native American populations. Due Modern relations between non-Native Americans and
to a combination of exposure to disease, technological Native Americans are more commercial than the past.
inferiority, and a lack of adaptable hierarchies, Native Since the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
Americans were unable to halt aggressive European of 1988, I will illustrate that Native Americans have
settlement (Trigger, 1991). During this time of initial increasingly benefited from their proximity to larger
settlement and conflict, Native American tribes populations of non-Native American populations in the
Introduction
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United States. As casinos continue to be the revenue
lifeblood of many tribal economies, this financial benefit
to the tribe has allowed them to improve conditions on
the reservation; however, not all tribes have benefited
equally (Akee et al, 2015).
Using California as a case study, I examine the
relationship between tribal gaming revenue and the
population of surrounding areas. I find that casinos
near larger populations of non-Native Americans are
associated with more expensive operating agreements
(tribal compacts) with the state. These tribal compacts
are only feasible for casinos that are bringing in
large numbers of visitors and considerable gaming
revenue. By studying California’s data regarding its
Revenue Sharing Trust Fund, I am able to quantify the
relationship between casino success and distance to
population centers. The following sections of this paper
describe the background literature, followed by a review
of the literature specifically pertaining to the diffusion
of tribal gaming policy. I then demonstrate that
geographic location plays an important role explaining
a tribes’ decision to expand gaming. To do so, I look
at the different types of compacts negotiated between
tribal and state leaders. I posit that being located
near densely populated non-tribal cities increases the
likelihood of tribal gaming success measured as their
contribution to Revenue Sharing Trust Fund. To test
this hypothesis, I use a logistic regression.

refused to enter any negotiations with tribes. These
states do not recognize the tribes’ sovereignty rights
and continually consider challenging the legality of
gambling implementations through the court system.
Similar to diffusion in other policy areas, patterns began
to emerge as to which states were more cooperative with
tribal innovations.
Overall IGRA is an essential time point for my
analysis as it allowed the State of California to enter
into agreement with the numerous tribal governments
in the state. California’s specific revenue-sharing plan
will be discussed in further detail, but suffice it to say
for now, the ability for tribal governments to weigh the
pros and cons of gaming expansion was the direct result
of IGRA and decisions by the voters of California who
passed policies favorable to tribal governments, which
encouraged gaming expansion if it could be considered
profitable.
Diffusion and tribal gaming
Policy diffusion is the process by which an innovation
is communicated through certain channels over time
among the members of a social system (Rogers 2010).
While there is abundant literature on policy diffusion,
the current landscape of research specifically on the
diffusion of gaming policy is quite sparse, particularly in
the realm of tribal gaming. Regarding legalized gaming
compacts, Boehmke and Witmer (2004) differentiate
considerations for states to adopting versus expanding
tribal gaming policies. The authors find evidence that
social learning influences adoption, but not policy
expansion; meanwhile, economic competition is
relevant for both expansion and adoption. Yet, they
consider tribal compacts as potentially possible in all 50
states, while 14 states do not have federally recognized
tribes. They included all states claiming the land-intrust process allows for tribes to open casinos in states
where they do not reside.
This claim is problematic on two fronts. First,
opening a casino with trust land is a procedure with
complicated criteria consisting of several factors such as
tribal best interest, detriment to surrounding area, and
proximity to reservation boundaries (Staudenmaier
2003). The examples given by Boehmke and Witmer
(2004) of potential casinos in non-tribal states were of
tribal compacts for casinos on land adjacent to tribal
territory. Second, the United States Supreme Court
determined in Cacieri v Salazaar that land-in-trust
transactions were only applicable to tribes that were
federally recognized in 1934 as part of the Indian

Indian Gaming Regulatory Act – Balancing tribal
sovereignty and states’ rights
Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (hereafter: IGRA) in 1988 after court issues arose
between tribes and their respective states. The act was
implemented to balance the rights of sovereign tribes
with state rights regarding their gambling laws (Mason,
2000). Tribes had full authority over traditional
ceremonial gaming (class I) but were also legally
allowed to run bingo type games and non-banked card
games on tribal lands (class II). In order to run class
III games (banked table games, slot machines, high
dollar jackpots), tribes were supposed to enter into
agreements known as Tribal Compacts with the state
(Gover, 2010). IGRA also created the National Indian
Gaming Commission to administer and advise tribes on
how to navigate their gaming endeavors. The responses
by different states were divergent. Some states, such as
Michigan and Minnesota, quickly entered tribal-state
compacts with variation in how much revenue sharing
took place. Other states, like Texas and Alabama, have
2
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Reorganization Act (Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379
(2009)). That restricts the ability of roughly one third
of the tribal nations located within the lower 48 to
participate in this process. An additional issue with the
article is that Boehmke and Witmer (2004) consider the
decision-makers of the tribal compacts to be the state
officials, failing to account for the role of tribal nations
as negotiators and their impact on policy diffusion.
Connor and Taggart (2013) find that per capita
income and length of time that a gaming compact has
been signed will lead to greater likelihood of adopting
a revenue allocation plan with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. A revenue allocation plan (hereafter: RAP) is
a requirement for tribes that intend to make financial
disbursements of casinos revenue to tribal members.
According to IGRA (1988), casino revenue is intended
for economic development, funding tribal government,
making charitable donations, assisting local government
agencies, and providing for the general welfare of tribal
members. RAP proposals are sent to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs for approval by the appropriate bureau
official and are supposed to be implemented only after
sufficient demonstration that casino revenue has been
used for its other intended purposes (Office of Inspector
General, 2003). While Connor and Taggart (2013)
argue that economic and social conditions among RAP
adopters are more favorable compared to nonadopters,
there are multiple areas of concern regarding how
they reached that conclusion and whether it should be
considered robust.
First, they cannot account for tribes that have been
operating casinos illegally prior to signing a compact.
Prior to the passage of IGRA, many tribes operated
gaming during a legal gray period (Light and Rand,
2005) and data on those operations are difficult to come
by. Second, Connor and Taggart assume the Bureau
of Indian Affairs’ process of approving Tribal RAPs to
be much more rigorous than it is. An investigation by
the office of the inspector general (Office of Inspector
General, 2003) concludes that the RAP approval
process was broken, with 73 plans approved out of 75
submissions. Of those approvals, only five had any
relevant information about operation budgets, tribal
enrollment, and gaming profits. Additionally, tribes
can choose not to apply for a revenue distribution for
reasons unrelated to financial capability.
To overcome the problems identified, this paper reexamines the impact of population density on the success
of tribal casinos, measured by their fee contribution
status. First, I limit the scope of the analysis to

California, because it is a state where gaming compacts
are possible for all tribes; thus, limiting my analysis
to a place where all tribal governments are actually
capable of expanding gaming. Second, my choice of
dependent variable (Revenue Sharing Trust Fund donor
status) is an improvement for measuring tribal casino
success over the RAP adoption status, because it has
a substantive impact and is a more accurate measure
of tribal gaming prosperity. I have also added vital
control variables that have yet to be analyzed, such as
true length of time a tribal casino has been in operation,
which allows me to better analyze the role of illegal and
semi-legal gambling pre-IGRA. Finally, I add context
by using less aggregated and more localized data from
areas surrounding tribal casinos. This way, I can more
appropriately determine the relationship between those
statistics and tribal casino success.
Why California?
California has the largest Native American
population in the country with 109 federally recognized
tribes (Judicial Council of California, 2018). There
are currently 63 casinos in California (second only to
Oklahoma); however, California is home to the largest
number of gaming machines and gaming revenue of
any state in the United States. California’s position as
the most successful state in the Union for tribal gaming
policy makes it likely to be emulated by others and
especially relevant for academic study.
The state of California is the ideal location to
study the diffusion of gaming policy because it boasts
one of the most comprehensive processes for state/
tribal gaming compacts. In March 2000, California
voters passed Proposition 1A to amend the California
Constitution to allow the state to be sued if it does not
agree in good faith to negotiate with the tribes (Koenig,
2001). While most of the provisions of Proposition 5
in 1998 were nullified by the California Supreme Court
one year later, one remained as California waived its
right to State Sovereign Immunity and has become the
only state (to date) to do so in regard to tribal gaming
policy (Light et al, 2004). This law essentially allows
tribes in California to negotiate as sovereign nations.
In other states, the United States Supreme Court struck
down the enforcement mechanism of IGRA that forced
states to negotiate in good faith with tribes because it
violated the 11th Amendment (Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
These unique conditions allow for an examination
of the considerations of tribal leaders that lead them
3
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to the negotiating table with the state. California as
a case study offers the opportunity to see what tribal
leaders choose for their tribe as sovereign nations
with autonomy, whereas other states’ sovereign
immunity makes tribal leaders considerably less
important in negotiating. In these states, the
government can choose to violate IGRA and not
show up to the negotiating table without fear of any
legal consequence.
Another reason California is an important case study
is because of the state’s unique Revenue Sharing Trust
Fund (hereafter: RSTF). Tribes with casinos pay into
a fund through a combination of fees and revenue cut
– and from that fund, each non-gaming tribe receives
four payments per year totaling $1.1M (Meister, 2003).
The twist is that included in the non-gaming tribes
category are tribes with casinos that have less than
350 slot machines. Tribes with larger, more lucrative
operations, are used to subsidize the tribes with less
lucrative operations. To use a baseball analogy, it’s akin
to the Cubs, Red Sox and Yankees supplementing the
operating budgets of smaller market teams – and there’s
significant variation among the tribes in this category:
about 40% are receivers, 25% are former receivers
who have transitioned to becoming donors, and the
remaining 35% have always been donors to the fund
(California Gambling Control Commission, 2017).
What accounts for this variation? What conditions lead
to tribes deciding that it’s in their best economic interest
to forego $1.1M per year and instead pay additional
taxes and share casino profits with the other tribes? The
answer to these questions hinge on the calculations of
tribal leaders in determining the potential revenue their
tribe would receive under different classifications in the
Revenue Sharing Trust Fund.
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it surpasses a certain threshold of machines and
revenue. Tribes with smaller casinos will benefit from
the fund and are only required to pay into the fund
when they have lucrative gaming compacts for large
casinos. Logically, tribes with land closest to major
population areas will receive more traffic, greater
amounts of revenue and more prosperity overall than
their counterparts farther from population centers.
Since the rewards of building the large casinos in these
locations will be greater than the mandatory donation
to the tribal gaming fund, these casinos pay into the
fund or choose to expand into fund payment criteria
despite the contribution requirement.
Potential Revenue Hypothesis: Tribes with the
highest potential for increased revenue from their local
environment (surrounding population, surrounding
affluence, and attraction variety) will be more likely to
hold the status of donor to the RSTF.
As shown earlier, California gives tribes significant
autonomy in gaming policy. This allows for self-interestbased cost/benefit calculations by tribal leaders as the
significant criteria in determining whether to expand
gaming. Assuming the tribal leaders are rational actors
and costs can be outweighed by potential revenues, the
role of nearby populations becomes an important factor
in determining the earning potential for proposed
casinos. Tribes further from population centers will
recognize the limited potential for revenue due to lack
of a population base and will choose to simply take
their share of the allocation from the state tribal fund.
Meanwhile, tribes near population centers will seek to
open new and large casinos (despite the mandatory
payments to the state tribal fund) due to the potential
for massive amounts of revenue.
Population Hypothesis: Receiver tribes near larger
population centers will be more likely to adopt donor
status relative to other receiver tribes.
The conditions in the state of California provide
perfect testing grounds for considering the role
of population density in the development of larger
gaming facilities. Since amendments and propositions
have given tribes significant power, they can reflect
more on their economic interests in considering
whether to build larger gaming facilities. Given
that they can also accept revenue without any costs
incurred (except potential revenue lost) by simply
not building large facilities, this test allows us to see
how the geographic constraints of nearby population
density impact the decision to build larger facilities
and adding machines. The revenue that tribes are

Tribal gaming expansion: the economic trade-off
Casinos share many characteristics with other
entertainment-based businesses. For this reason, I
believe factors relevant for the success of businesses
are important indicators of successful casinos. Like
businesses, casinos frequently incorporate ‘gravity
models’ to calculate the likelihood of success (Barrow
and Borges, 2014). While these models vary, they
mainly capture population within range, per capita
income, and the distance of the nearest competitor,
because these metrics are generally the best predictors
of business potential. As stated, California’s process
for negotiating gaming compacts has set up a tribal
fund, which takes money from Indian gaming once
4
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guaranteed provides a strong incentive to only enter
into more expensive agreements when they are certain
that the probability for even greater revenues occur.
In an ironic twist, the proximity of tribes to nonNative populations provides serious benefits in the
twenty-first century; however, the same conditions
have frequently been incredibly detrimental to Native
populations in the past (Trigger, 1991).
Sparse Population Hypothesis: Receiver tribes
farther from population areas will accept the limited
potential for casino profit and will instead choose to
avoid donating to the tribal fund.

Table 1
Number
of Current
RSTF Donors Donor
vs. Recipients
Tribes
37
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RTSF Current RTSF
Receiver
26

Key Independent Variables
In this analysis, I have included three variables of
special importance. First, I have created a variable
measuring semi-legal and illegal gaming prior to IGRA.
Second, I’ve included a measure of population density
in surrounding areas, which I predict will be the most
impactful on the choice of states to adopt RSTF donor
status. Finally, I have created an attraction variety index
to measure the other different types of entertainment
available on the grounds of the tribal gaming facilities.
Together, these three variables offer a substantial
improvement over previous analysis which frequently
overlook the importance of the existence of semilegal casinos pre-IGRA, surrounding population, and
surrounding attractions available to tourists.
Early Mover is the binary variable indicating
whether or not a casino existed prior to the passage of
IGRA. It is a well-established concept in business that
early entrants create long-term competitive advantages
(Kerin et al, 1992). In addition to the theoretical market
advantage, many modern tribal casinos may have also
benefited from belonging to tribes that had won in
pivotal court battles impacting tribal gaming rights.
By tracking this previously unavailable data regarding
casinos in operation pre-IGRA from internal reports
and correspondences with the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
I am able to test the theoretical portability of this
concept from business to tribal casino gaming.
To capture the population surroundings of tribal
facilities (Surrounding Metro Area), I use the Missouri
Census Data Center, which generates demographic
information with its Circular Area Profile application
using 2010 Census data. I record population data of a 75mile radius from each tribal casino in California, which
is consistent with, but more precise than the collection
methods that Christiansen used in his pre-IGRA report
on tribal gaming’s impact on the gaming industry
commissioned by Mirage Resorts International in1986.
Back then Christiansen aggregated the population of all
counties within 75 miles of tribal gaming facility.
Finally, I attempt to capture the additional
accommodations (Variety Index), which tribal leaders
may see as assets in drawing in casino guests by creating

Data and Model Specifications
For this project, I am using self-collected data from
the Eugene Martin Christiansen Papers at Special
Collections at the University of Nevada Las Vegas.
These files collected by the esteemed career gaming
consultant and advisor give a detailed account of
various gaming activities (both legal and illegal) that
were being conducted across the United States. With
particular focus to reports from the time period before
and after the passage of IGRA, this collection allows me
to better track the development of tribal casinos and
how early and previously unanalyzed factors can affect
modern conditions.
The dependent variable is a binary variable that
indicates if the tribe is a RSTF donor. If yes, the tribe
is coded as 1; if the tribe is a RSTF receiver, the tribe is
coded as 0. The distribution is shown on Table 1. Data
on RSTF was collected from the California Gaming
Control Board, which is the only government entity to
officially report on the agreements. These agreements
give a good account of the category of gaming.
Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of RSTF
donors in comparison with RSTF recipients. Given
the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, a
logistic regression model is the appropriate method
of analysis (Dayton, 1992). While this analysis can
be considered quite rudimentary, it offers the first
attempt to include the role of existing illegal gaming,
RSTF status, and detailed descriptions of the actual
gaming facilities. I include a battery of control
variables to work against the possibility that the effect
of demographic density is spurious and to account for
previous explanations in the gaming expansion and
policy diffusion literature.
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an index measure of attraction variety by collecting data
from the various casino and tribal information websites.
Not everyone enjoys gaming, but frequently trips to the
casino are social affair. The existence of golf courses,
theme parks, spas, live entertainment, race tracks and
shopping can help push tribal leaders toward expansion
by offering a greater gravity effect and drawing in more
guest.

Table 2

Variables
Surrounding Metro Area
Odds Ratio
Z-score
Early Mover
Odds Ratio
Z-score
Years Open
Odds Ratio
Z-score
County Per Cap Income
Odds Ratio
Z-score
Tribal Size
Odds Ratio
Z-score
Reservations
Odds Ratio
Z-score
Number of Tables
Odds Ratio
Z-score
Variety Index
Odds Ratio
Z-score
Observations

Control Variables
Separate from the three independent variables I
predict to be of most impact are a variety of control
variables. County Per Cap Income is the per capita
income of the surrounding county in 2010, which
accounts for the affluence of a tribal casino’s most likely
customers. Given the potential for increasing revenue
for the tribal casino facility, this variable is predicted to
be positively associated with RSTF donor status. Years
Open is a separate measure from early mover advantage
because many tribal casinos were opened after IGRA.
This variable measures the experience factor and is
expected to be positively associated with RSTF status.
Finally, an important aspect for tribal gaming is the
actual composition of the tribe (Tribal Size), competitive
tribes in the area, and the number of tables at the
casino. To capture the size of the tribe, I include data
from the California Indians database at San Diego State
University. The literature suggests that smaller tribes
are more likely to adopt RSTF donor status, because the
distribution of income from the RSTF is based on per
capita calculations. The number of people in a specific
tribe is important for determining their calculations in
the cost/benefit analysis of moving up to RSTF donor
status; however, nearby tribes also play an important
role.
To capture the competition effects of potential
gaming facilities on nearby tribal lands, I incorporate
a measure of tribal neighbors. If a nearby tribe exists
within a 75-mile radius, they pose a significant risk
of reducing the draw from nearby population centers.
This is because nearby residents who would be split
into smaller radiuses for their ‘hometown’ casinos
in a manner similar to the same drawing in impact
from 75 miles. There is also the matter of the number
of tables. Under the RSTF agreement, the number of
tables for gambling is not strictly regulated (especially
in comparison to slots). Since some tribes may seek
to maximize non-RSTF eligible revenue through
additional gaming tables, I have included the number
of tables at each tribal casino.

RSTF Donor
**
1.057521
1.99
.6557911
-0.31
*
.7943943
-1.94
1.00162
-3.32
0.9994149
-0.88
*
.8134814
-1.84
*
1.099318
1.91
*
3.029991
1.90
62

Findings
The results from my logistic regression model (Table
2) provide strong evidence in support of all three of my
hypotheses. First, the Potential Revenue Hypothesis is
supported by a positive association between population
density and the attraction variety index measure. The
Population Hypothesis and the Sparse Population
Hypothesis are both supported by the strong relationship
between population density and adopting RSTF donor
status.
The biggest takeaway from this analysis is the
population effect. It was found to be statistically
significant in the model. It illustrates that an increase
in population of 100K in the surrounding 75 mi radius
increases the likelihood of the tribe adopting RSTF
donor status by 5.75%. The surrounding population
7
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distribution is very wide, and ranges from a low of generate additional revenue has broad implications for
35K to over 17 million people. Given the huge range casinos on tribal lands and beyond.
of population, this measure appears to be incredibly
robust and offers a good explanation of why some tribes
may never seriously consider adopting large gaming
facilities with over 350 slot machines.
Two other variables that met the 90 percent
confidence level of statistical significance were
neighboring tribes and the index measure for variety of
attractions. Both provide some preliminary support for
the Potential Revenue Hypothesis. Neighboring tribes
had a negative impact on the adoption of RSTF donor
status.
The number of other attractions nearby had the
expected positive impact on gaming expansion. Years
open had a negative expected impact. All findings
deserve further research but provide some additional
level of support for the main arguments of this paper,
with the main takeaway being the population effect
as the most statistically significant variable impacting
RSTF status.
Discussion
It is ironic that for centuries, the luckiest Indian tribes
in the country were the ones that happened to be far away
from white settlers, and now extreme economic success is
dependent upon being closer to non-tribal populations.
The relationship between potential revenue sources (in
this analysis: population within 75-mile radius) has the
strongest and most consistent impact on the likelihood
that a tribe will choose to expand their gaming facilities.
All of this makes sense for tribal governments in
California as they are granted a level of autonomy and
respect at the negotiating table that is found nowhere
else in the United States. This analysis merely provides
evidence that when granted this autonomous power to
conduct the business of gaming, tribal leaders choose
to expand when the cost/benefit analysis of potential
revenue from gaming expansion surpasses the revenue
doled out per capita by the RSTF to recipient tribes.
Further research should analyze these findings using
panel data to more accurately control for time effects.
The addition of a time component may provide even
more interesting findings about the role of the business
cycle, budget crunches and different tribal leaders on
the decision to expand gaming. While population near
tribal lands seems to be the most important factor,
additional research on the value-added from nearby
attractions could yield interesting results. This idea
of nearby businesses and tourist hot-spots as a way to
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